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GRAPPLING WITH GLOBAL MIGRATION: JUDICIAL 
PREDISPOSITIONS, REGULATORY REGIMES, AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW SYSTEMS 
Leila Kawar 
BANKS MILLER, LINDA CAMP KEITH, & JENNIFER S. HOLMES, IMMIGRATION 
JUDGES AND U.S. ASYLUM POLICY (UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA PRESS 
2015). PP. 248. HARDCOVER $ 69.95. 
 
REBECCA HAMLIN, LET ME BE A REFUGEE: ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE 
POLITICS OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES, CANADA, AND AUSTRALIA 
(OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 2014). PP. 248. PAPERBACK $ 29.95. 
 
MARIE-BÉNÉDICTE DEMBOUR, WHEN HUMANS BECOME MIGRANTS: STUDY OF 
THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS WITH AN INTER-AMERICAN 
COUNTERPOINT (OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 2015). PP. 576. PAPERBACK $ 
55.00. 
The world is on the move. The United Nations estimates that there are currently 
some 232 million international migrants and that global migration has increased by fifty 
percent since 1990.1 This flux of human mobility is reshaping not only national identities 
but also the organization and operations of state institutions. As legislators revise legal 
categories and mandate new programs, administrative apparatuses and policies need to be 
constructed to give effect to the rapidly evolving shape of migration governance. With 
regulatory activity related to cross-border movement steadily increasing in scope, legal 
actors and institutions are increasingly called upon to review how these policies are elab-
orated and applied. 
From the perspective of U.S. legal scholars and practitioners, these developments 
have transformed immigration law from a domain relegated to marginalized specialists 
into an increasingly significant subfield. High-profile legal activism on immigration issues 
is now organized by an institutionalized network of accomplished practitioners and public 
                                                          
  Leila Kawar is assistant professor of Political Science and Legal Studies at the University of Massachusetts, 
Amherst. 
 1. U.N. Department of Economic and Social Affairs, International Migration Report, 1, U.N. Doc. 
ST/ESA/SER.A/346 (2013). 
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interest law firms. This expansion in law reform activity has supported—and has been 
supported by—a parallel expansion and legitimation of immigration and refugee law 
within the ranks of legal academia. Immigration-related scholarship has increased in both 
size and visibility. Clinical practice is also rapidly growing; the Center for the Study of 
Applied Legal Education lists immigration and refugee law clinics as one of the fastest 
growing areas within U.S. law schools.2 
How might empirical sociolegal scholarship contribute to our understanding of law’s 
growing engagement with immigration issues? While legal scholars have tended to focus 
on the substantive content of regulatory policies and doctrinal principles, social scientists 
have turned to their own sets of disciplinary tools to explore the institutional settings re-
sponsible for handling migrants’ claims. Each of the three books discussed in this review 
aims to inform debates concerning how migrants’ claims are adjudicated. Moreover, each 
empirical analysis is guided by a distinct analytical framework: judicial behavioralism, 
comparative historical institutionalism, and discourse analysis. By examining different 
pieces of the institutional architecture charged with implementing immigration and asylum 
law, they collectively point towards a more nuanced understanding of how legal institu-
tions are grappling with global migration. In what follows, I discuss each book in turn, 
highlighting elements of their respective empirical analyses that may be of particular in-
terest to U.S. legal scholars and practitioners. 
DECISION-MAKING OF IMMIGRATION JUDGES 
For most migrants seeking to challenge an order of removal or expulsion, an asylum 
hearing represents the only segment of immigration law’s institutional architecture with 
which they will come into direct contact. As restrictive border-control policies have been 
adopted by states across the global north, applying for asylum or one of the other forms of 
subsidiary protection allows migrants a side-door to permanent settlement when the front-
door essentially has been closed to them. The 1951 Geneva Convention on Refugees sets 
a broad normative baseline for asylum adjudication; however, individual asylum decisions 
are heavily reliant on threshold evidentiary assessments and determinations of credibility. 
In practice, this means that there is plenty of room for adjudicators acting in good faith to 
interpret similar facts differently and also ample opportunity for legally-irrelevant consid-
erations to influence their decision-making. 
Immigration Judges and U.S. Asylum Policy represents the most ambitious and de-
tailed effort to date at examining the drivers of decision-making by street level asylum 
adjudicators.3 The authors, Banks Miller, Linda Camp Keith, and Jennifer S. Holmes, are 
colleagues at the University of Texas at Dallas, and they rely on multiple Freedom of In-
formation Act requests to assemble a dataset of more than 500,000 asylum cases decided 
by U.S. immigration judges (IJs) between 1990 and 2010. As the authors acknowledge, 
                                                          
 2. Robert R. Kuehn & David A. Santacroce, 2013-14 Survey of Applied Legal Education, CENTER FOR THE 
STUDY OF APPLIED LEGAL EDUCATION, (2014) http://www.csale.org/files/Report_on_2013-
14_CSALE_Survey.pdf. 
 3. BANKS MILLER, LINDA CAMP KEITH & JENNIFER S. HOLMES, IMMIGRATION JUDGES AND U.S. ASYLUM 
POLICY 38 (2015). 
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IJs are not the only adjudicators to decide asylum claims in the first instance. However, 
IJs do handle the majority of asylum claims and virtually all of the claims in which the 
applicant is not clearly eligible for asylum, thereby warranting extensive empirical study 
of their decision patterns.4 
Applying the theoretical tools of political science scholarship on judicial behavior, 
the authors aim to tease apart the legal and non-legal factors that are relevant for IJs as 
they make decisions in individual asylum cases. Their impressively large dataset allows 
them to use multivariate regression techniques to model the impact of a range of independ-
ent variables on case outcomes, something which had not been attempted in prior empirical 
studies examining differential grant rates among judges. Miller et al. collect or create 
measurements related to the characteristics of the applicant’s country of origin, the local 
district in which the case is adjudicated, and the policy predispositions that shape the in-
dividual adjudicator’s approach to asylum determinations. 
This last variable offers the theoretical hook linking the authors’ study of asylum 
decision-making to the judicial behavior scholarship, and so it deserves special attention. 
Policy predispositions are measured as the “degree to which an IJ has been socialized to 
give the benefit of the doubt to asylum seekers.”5 The authors find empirical support for 
their intuition that experience as a prosecutor, in the military, or in an administrative 
agency charged with immigration control makes an IJ relatively more skeptical towards 
asylum claims, whereas working for an NGO or in academia has the opposite effect. They 
note that this asylum-specific measure of policy predispositions does a much better job of 
predicting behavior (controlling for other factors) than generic measures of political ide-
ology, such as the political liberalism of the appointing president. This confirms a more 
general finding in the immigration politics scholarship that attitudes towards immigration-
related matters should not be conflated with political party platforms.6 
Through what kind of cognitive mechanism might these asylum policy predisposi-
tions color IJs’ determination of individual cases? The authors suggest that the heavy 
workload of IJs, in combination with the absence of clear doctrinal signals from reviewing 
courts and the highly ambiguous nature of evidence in asylum cases, make asylum adju-
dicators especially prone to rely on informal cues. Their cognitive behavioral model sug-
gests that IJs’ policy predispositions will be mediated in certain circumstances but not in 
others. In other words, they organize their analysis of IJ decision-making so as to explore 
the interaction between, on the one hand, characteristics of an applicant and, on the other 
hand, the degree to which judges express their intuitive skepticism or sympathy towards 
asylum seekers. 
Applying this model, the authors find evidence that conservative (i.e., skeptical) asy-
lum policy predispositions are expressed more fully when the applicant is from a country 
“producing high numbers of illegal immigrants,” while liberal predispositions are ex-
pressed more strongly when the applicant comes from a country receiving U.S. military 
                                                          
 4. Id. at 2-3. 
 5. Id. at 38. 
 6. See, e.g., JAMES G. GIMPEL & JAMES R. EDWARDS, THE CONGRESSIONAL POLITICS OF IMMIGRATION 
REFORM (1998). 
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aid.7 By contrast, the authors find that the expression of policy predispositions is unrelated 
to how the U.S. State Department ranks the asylum applicant’s country of origin on a scale 
of human rights abuse. Turning from foreign policy biases to domestic political biases, the 
authors find that liberal IJs are substantially more likely to grant some form of deportation 
relief when they sit on immigration courts in metropolitan areas, where whole areas of the 
economy (e.g., landscaping labor) are sustained by undocumented migrants. By contrast, 
liberal IJs are substantially less likely to grant relief when located in areas with high un-
employment rates. These findings are clearly significant and deserve attention. 
At the same time, it is important to recognize that, while the data gives clear evidence 
that interaction effects exist, the authors’ narration of the politics behind these effects re-
mains open to discussion. For instance, Miller et al. characterize their finding that State 
Department rankings have no particular bias-triggering effect among liberal IJs (as com-
pared to conservative IJs) as demonstrating that “human rights concerns are interpreted 
less through the lens of asylum liberalism than are material and security concerns.”8 This 
labeling of State Department country reports as an objectively legal factor is open to dis-
cussion, however, because historically the manner in which these reports are legally rele-
vant has itself been the subject of political contestation.9 Along the same lines, the authors’ 
interpretation of the interaction effects associated with an immigration court’s geographic 
location raises more questions than it answers. Having found that liberal IJs are substan-
tially less likely to grant relief when located in areas with high unemployment rates, Miller 
et al. suggest that these adjudicators may see migrants as a threat to other segments of the 
domestic labor force “to whom liberals may be more solicitous.”10 This is a plausible ac-
count, but the authors acknowledge that it remains a somewhat speculative explanation for 
a finding that they had not anticipated; as yet, we have no firm way of knowing why liberal 
IJs in some metropolitan areas act more or less liberally than their peers in other districts. 
Tangential to the authors’ cognitive approach, but of interest to immigrant rights 
advocates, the data suggests that being represented by counsel increases the chance of 
receiving some form of relief by between five and six percent (with other causal factors 
held constant). This is not as significant an effect as suggested by prior studies, and Miller 
et al. contend that their more comprehensive dataset may include more variable types of 
legal representation, so that the aggregate quality of representation is lower.11 By contrast, 
they find strong evidence that asylum seekers have a substantially better chance of receiv-
ing relief when they are based in cities with a developed NGO support network.12 Finally, 
they find that legal representation is the single most important factor of an applicant’s 
decision to appeal an IJ’s denial of relief. 
Somewhat unexpectedly, given the extensive discussion of the cognitive model at 
                                                          
 7. MILLER, KEITH & HOLMES, supra note 3, at 58. 
 8. Id. at 81. 
 9. For most of the 1980s, U.S. refugee advocates struggled to move asylum adjudication away from heavy 
reliance on State Department country reports and towards more individualized determinations, which they 
viewed as more in keeping with international legal norms. See Gregg A. Beyer, Establishing the United States 
Asylum Officer Corps: A First Report. 4 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 455 (1992). 
 10. MILLER, KEITH & HOLMES, supra note 3, at 101. 
 11. Id. at 71. 
 12. Id. at 104. 
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the beginning of the book, the final two substantive chapters move away from modeling 
how predispositions impact asylum adjudication in order to explore other aspects of polit-
ical behavior related to the asylum process. Chapter five explores the strategic responses 
of IJs to the incentive structures created by the threat of having their decisions overturned 
by higher-level jurisdictions. The authors examine these strategic responses in the context 
of the controversial streamlining program implemented by Attorney General John Ash-
croft. Chapter six turns to an impact study of two prominent legislative initiatives that 
aimed to reform the U.S. asylum system. Looking at monthly aggregated grant rates, the 
authors aim to debunk what they view as exaggerated claims made by proponents of im-
migration restrictionism concerning the effects of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Im-
migrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) and the Real ID Act of 2005. They argue 
that the rhetoric surrounding restrictionist initiatives is essentially all bark and no bite, so 
long as economic forces continue to drive strong demand for low-wage migrant labor. And 
they find confirmation for this view in time series data showing that the enactment of 
IIRIRA resulted in a higher grant rate overall and particularly for applicants coming from 
countries classified as “middle income or above” and “where al-Qaeda does not have a 
presence.”13 The authors acknowledge in a footnote that the legislation did prevent many 
individuals eligible for refugee status from ever entering the United States to claim asylum, 
but this important caveat is not pursued further.14 Instead, the authors describe the appli-
cant pool post-1996 as being of higher quality, because it contains fewer economic mi-
grants and potential terrorists. 
For this reviewer, the time-series analysis was the least convincing part of the book. 
In particular, the authors’ operationalization of a migrant’s “quality” solely on the basis of 
somewhat questionable country-level associations such as “countries in which al-Qaeda is 
present” appears tenuous at best and at worst misleading, insofar as it misconstrues the 
standards of international refugee law.15 Moreover, as Cecilia Menjivar and Daniel Kan-
stroom, among others, have shown, the rhetoric of restrictionism has pernicious and radi-
ating effects that cannot be grasped in an analysis that flattens the multiple dimensions of 
migrant governance into a single dependent variable, i.e., number of admitted migrants.16 
In short, the analysis of legislative impact seems tangential to the cognitive behavioral 
modeling undertaken in earlier chapters. It distracts the reader from the interesting and 
complex stories suggested by the authors’ sophisticated examination of judicial decision-
making. 
ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF ASYLUM 
Rebecca Hamlin begins her study of the politics of asylum in, Let Me Be a Refugee: 
Administrative Justice and the Politics of Asylum in the United States, Canada, and Aus-
                                                          
 13. Id. at 171-75. 
 14. Id. at 216. 
 15. MILLER, KEITH, & HOLMES, supra note 3, at 171. 
 16. See generally CECILIA MENJIVAR & DANIEL J. KANSTROOM, CONSTRUCTING IMMIGRANT ILLEGALITY 
(2014). 
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tralia—which recently received an honorable mention for best book on migration and cit-
izenship from the American Political Science Association—with the following puzzle: 
why do the asylum systems of three culturally similar liberal democracies produce strik-
ingly divergent grant rates, even for applicants from the same country of origin?17 Rather 
than trying to investigate how individual adjudicators are influenced by their policy pre-
dispositions, Hamlin focuses on institutional features that distinguish U.S., Canadian, and 
Australian asylum processes at the institutional level. Specifically, she considers the im-
pact of institutionalized features of the administrative agencies charged with refugee status 
determination as well as the institutionalized patterns that characterize these agencies’ re-
lations with other branches of government. 
The cross-national comparative approach that Hamlin applies to asylum policy im-
plementation is informed by Robert Kagan’s typology of administrative decision-making 
styles.18 She argues that cross-national differences in asylum decision outcomes are best 
explained, not by national-level variation in access to the judiciary, but rather by the dis-
tinct decision-making styles institutionalized within each country’s “system of refugee 
status determination.”19 Administrative decision-making styles are at the heart of this anal-
ysis, and two distinct dimensions of variation are explored: first, the degree to which ref-
ugee status determination is controlled by formalized rules, and second, the degree to 
which it is open to interest group participation. In other words, while the international law 
definition of a refugee sets a common starting point, Hamlin finds that national systems 
have come to rely on differing mixes of the ingredients of administrative justice to guide 
the application and elaboration of this common standard.20 The book develops the argu-
ment that these differing recipes for refugee status determination have important effects, 
when viewed in aggregate, on final outcomes for asylum seekers. 
The first section of the book sets out the different institutionalized patterns of agency 
processes in the U.S., Canada, and Australia respectively. Hamlin characterizes refugee 
status determination in the U.S. as “a terrain that is fraught with turf wars and interbranch 
conflict.”21 Decision-making is fragmented across multiple agencies, policymaking is 
open to interest group participation, procedural rules for all but one stage of the process 
are highly elaborated, and high degrees of variation exist between decision-makers. Fo-
cusing on the period since 1999, and particularly on the controversy surrounding the 
streamlining program of Attorney General Ashcroft, Hamlin describes an explosion of 
immigration litigation which has judicialized U.S. refugee status determination processes. 
This description will be familiar to U.S. practitioners, who have written extensively about 
this period. Yet U.S. immigration specialists may not be aware of how differently things 
might operate in other national settings. Hamlin’s comparative case studies are helpful for 
placing the U.S. system in perspective. 
This is particularly evident when the U.S. system is set against Canada’s “Cadillac 
                                                          
 17. REBECCA HAMLIN, LET ME BE A REFUGEE: ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF ASYLUM IN 
THE UNITED STATES, CANADA, AND AUSTRALIA 19-20 (2014). 
 18. ROBERT KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW 9-10 (2001). 
 19. HAMLIN, supra note 17. 
 20. Id. at 18. 
 21. Id. at 66. 
6
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 51 [2015], Iss. 2, Art. 18
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol51/iss2/18
KAWAR_3.13.16 (DO NOT DELETE) 3/13/2016  11:25 PM 
2016] GRAPPLING WITH GLOBAL MIGRATION 441 
system” of refugee status determination, in which bureaucratic experts have high levels of 
discretion to make decisions without legislative tinkering and with relatively minimized 
and “cordial” judicial guidance.22 In Hamlin’s account, in the mid-1980s, spurred by a 
decision of the Supreme Court of Canada holding that the Canadian Charter of Rights was 
applicable to unauthorized entrants, Canada invested resources in creating a tribunal that 
aimed to meet high standards of “accuracy, active investigation, and effective manage-
ment.”23 Hamlin suggests that centralized decision-making has allowed the Canadian Im-
migration and Refugee Board (IRB) to effectively manage its operations and adjust them 
in a timely manner to new circumstances. In contrast to the U.S. system, Canada’s refugee 
status determination processes are much more insulated from judicial error-correcting, 
since only one percent of claims rejected by the IRB are overturned.24 They are also rela-
tively more insulated from interventions from elected officials, although this may partly 
result from the fact that the IRB has showed a willingness to proactively enact “manage-
ment strategies” in response to sudden and rapid influx of certain types of claimants in 
order to ensure that its resources are not overwhelmed.25 
Of course, as seen in the Canadian response to a sizable and rapid influx of Czech 
Roma asylum applicants, expert-dominated administrative justice may at times privilege 
sustainability of the system over individualized determinations.26 This impulse towards 
restrictionism in times of “emergency” might be read as evidence that Canada’s systemic 
bias towards generosity requires investment of substantial resources and is probably only 
feasible in a country that, most of the time, has relatively low numbers of asylum appli-
cants. Hamlin does not make this argument explicitly, but she does describe how the sys-
tem has come under pressure in recent years both from conservative politicians and also 
from leaders of the Canadian legal profession who seek to add greater formality to admin-
istrative processes. 
While the U.S. and Canada have developed stable institutional structures and settled 
understandings of how the various parts of their respective systems fit together, it is more 
difficult to classify any stable refugee status determination “regime” in Australia. Ham-
lin’s description of the Australian system highlights the influence of frequent changes in 
legislation and abrupt evolutions in jurisprudence, as well as the dramatically fluctuating 
rates at which rejected applicants seek a judicial remedy. As she notes, Australia’s main 
administrative structure for handling refugee status determination was created only in 
1992. Hamlin tentatively labels the Australian regime one of “bureaucratic-adversarial-
ism,” a schizophrenic system that cannot choose between its expert-driven and adversarial 
tendencies and thus achieves neither model of administrative justice particularly well.27 
Chapters seven through nine offer three illustrative vignettes showing how these na-
tional systems kick into action when similarly presented with a new kind of claim. The 
three kinds of novel claims examined are gender-based asylum claims, asylum claims 
based on the People’s Republic of China’s coercive population control policies, and claims 
                                                          
 22. Id. at 85. 
 23. Id. at 86 (discussing Singh v. Minister of Emp’t, 1 S.C.R. (1985)). 
 24. Id. at 94. 
 25. HAMLIN, supra note 17, at 99. 
 26. Id. at 91. 
 27. Id. at 19. 
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for protection based, not on the 1951 Refugee Convention, but on international human 
rights instruments. Certainly, the most illuminating illustration of how different regimes 
produce different outcomes is provided by the case of Chinese asylum claims. In contrast 
to the U.S. experience, Canadian elected officials have not sought to influence the direc-
tion of policymaking, and international refugee law guidelines have set a broad and work-
able standard, and its application to Chinese applicants generally has been left to the IRB.28 
Moreover, Canadian courts have not played any significant error-correcting role in super-
vising implementation because the IRB’s well-resourced bureaucratic processes ensure 
relatively consistent outcomes across cases. 
At the same time, the case study of Chinese asylum seekers also raises a tension in 
applying Kagan’s typology of administrative decision-making styles to national refugee 
status determination systems created to apply international norms. In this domain, the 
country most wedded to professionalized judgment is also the country most integrated into 
the international system. Yet there is no reason, per se, that internationalism and profes-
sional managerialism should go together (think of China, which has a highly developed 
technocracy but which is often at odds with the normative guidelines generated by inter-
national institutions). Hamlin seems at times to suggest that the resistance to international 
expert judgment in both the U.S. and Australia is linked to these countries’ respective 
modalities of administrative justice. She writes, “[t]he American RSD regime has largely 
ignored global legal developments, focusing in on its own domestic conflict and fragmen-
tation.”29 Clearly the distraction of partisanship is a major factor in U.S. asylum policy-
making, and this is the side of the equation on which Hamlin focuses her analysis. But it 
would also be interesting to explore the way in which domestic policymakers’ relation-
ships with international norms and institutions have been differently institutionalized in 
the asylum processes of these three countries. 
Hamlin’s book does not grapple explicitly with activity at the international level, 
which would inevitably complicate the comparative analysis. Instead, the book aims at 
clearly elaborating a single argument about the often-overlooked role of adjudicatory and 
appeals processes within administrative institutions and their importance in explaining 
why strikingly divergent asylum grant rates exist between decision-makers in some coun-
tries but not in others. 
THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL COURTS IN MIGRATION GOVERNANCE 
The two studies by political scientists discussed thus far both focus on explaining 
outcomes of cases involving asylum seekers. In these books, doctrinal developments are 
touched upon only to the extent that they are associated with significant shifts in aggre-
gated decision-outcomes. By contrast, in When Humans Become Migrants, legal anthro-
pologist Marie-Bénédicte Dembour devotes substantially greater attention to the text of 
court decisions elaborating the rights of non-citizens.30 Her analysis also differs from the 
two studies discussed above insofar as it focuses not on domestic law but rather on the 
                                                          
 28. Id. at 143-58. 
 29. Id. at 142. 
 30. MARIE-BÉNÉDICTE DEMBOUR, WHEN HUMANS BECOME MIGRANTS: STUDY OF THE EUROPEAN COURT 
OF HUMAN RIGHTS WITH AN INTER-AMERICAN COUNTERPOINT (2015). 
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lawmaking of two international courts, the European Court of Human Rights (the Euro-
pean Court) and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (the Inter-American Court). 
Many Americans associate the European Court with an assertive human rights juris-
prudence, particularly in the area of privacy rights. However, Dembour argues that the 
European Court’s handling of cases involving the rights of non-citizens has been signifi-
cantly less praiseworthy. In her assessment, the basic conceptual underpinning of the “Eu-
ropean Convention system” is that states need not relinquish sovereign authority to control 
migrants, with the corollary that human rights are simply a principle of good governance 
agreed to by states.31 She aims to show that the European Court’s attachment to this “stat-
ist” paradigm has colored migration cases, even when these cases have widely differing 
relevant legal issues and fact patterns. Moreover, she argues that this approach is not an 
inevitable feature of migration governance, and that European jurisprudence takes on a 
distinctly unflattering character when set against the work of the Inter-American Court in 
this area. 
In this sense, Dembour’s analysis goes beyond the detail-oriented doctrinal analysis 
that characterizes most contemporary legal scholarship. The book does not make any men-
tion of Montesquieu, but it seems to adopt a style of comparison driven by the concept of 
the “spirit” of the laws.32 The aim in “dissecting” the case law is not to delineate conceptual 
boundaries more clearly but rather to extract law’s ideological and affective underpin-
nings.33 Dembour notes that this approach casts a wider net than doctrinal analysis, since 
it looks for conceptual foundations that extend beyond doctrinal categories and whose le-
gal relevance is often not well-established. When Humans Become Migrants is more than 
500 pages in length and is dense with footnotes to case law and archival sources. There 
are long tangents for social and policy background to be explained. Dembour has also 
visited both courts, and her analysis is augmented by her personal observations of their 
operations. The book does not shy away from normative claims, and the text is at times 
written in a strongly denunciatory tone. 
The book begins by undertaking an analysis of the foundational moments for estab-
lishing the European and Inter-American human rights systems respectively. Examining 
the records of the travaux préparatoires for the European Convention on Human Rights, 
she concludes that the founders of the European human rights system did not exclude mi-
grants from the Convention’s ambit, but neither did they wish to consider the predicament 
of migrants in any detail or specifically grant them rights.34 The comparison with the Inter-
American system reveals a different “reflex” in Latin America, although the comparison 
is sometimes uneven since it is based on secondary rather than primary sources. 
Dembour then proceeds to examine the early decisions of the European Commission 
on Human Rights and the initial cases considered by the European Court. Through close 
textual analysis, she aims to show that the underlying philosophy of both the text of the 
Convention and its initial interpretation was that its rights-protective provisions were not 
intended for Europe’s former colonial subjects. She criticizes the European Court for its 
                                                          
 31. Id. at 7. 
 32. MONTESQUIEU, DE L’ESPRIT DES LOIS (1748). 
 33. DEMBOUR, supra note 30, at 22. 
 34. Id. at 60. 
9
Kawar: Grappling with Global Migration: Judicial Predispositions, Regula
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2015
KAWAR_3.13.16 (DO NOT DELETE) 3/13/2016  11:25 PM 
444 TULSA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:435 
formalistic refusal to acknowledge the colonial-racist motivation for distinctions in immi-
gration rules, and contrasts this against a “pro homine” human rights perspective which 
would place the burden on states to not only provide a public policy justification for these 
rules but also show that these public objectives could not be achieved in a less burdensome 
manner.35 For Dembour, these early foundational cases were a harbinger of subsequent 
developments, foreshadowing what kinds of cases the court would decide to hear and how 
it would decide them. 
This foundational period of the European Court’s handling of migration questions is 
then contrasted with an Inter-American counterpoint. Dembour’s claim is that it was not 
simply different texts and different institutional processes that explain the Inter-American 
Court’s more rights-protective approach. Rather, she argues that the difference between 
the two systems reveals their contrasting human rights paradigms. In her view, the Inter-
American Court has adopted a posture of openness to civil society as well as to other in-
ternational human rights instruments. It has tended to adopt broad rulings that aim for 
inspiration and that eschew pragmatic policy considerations. For Dembour, these are man-
ifestations of a broader “pro homine” paradigm, which puts human beings at the center of 
its reasoning so that migrants are thought of first as human beings. As she notes, this does 
not guarantee a finding against any given migration policy, but “the balance is slightly 
weighted . . . towards the individual.”36 
The case law of the European Court, discussed in chapters six through eight of the 
book, receives a much less favorable assessment. According to Dembour, the European 
Court has produced a “haphazard, inconsistent, and ultimately weak case law,” insofar as 
the application of a proportionality test to balance state sovereignty with the Article 8 right 
to family life has resulted in a lottery as to whether a violation will be found.37 She argues 
that the majority of the European Court has generally prioritized state sovereignty, using 
formalism to ignore the lived experiences of non-citizen residents who feel that their center 
of family life is in Europe. Dembour’s analysis of case law applying Article 3 of the Con-
vention reveals a similar state-centric bias. The European Court has outlined an absolute 
prohibition on an individual being deported to torture, but it has placed the burden of proof 
on the individual non-citizen to provide facts countering the conclusions of European state 
officials that there is no risk of ill-treatment. The crucial point, for Dembour, is that the 
European Court has showed a remarkable tentativeness in revisiting the facts as established 
by state asylum systems. In this respect, it adheres to a mode of reasoning—which has 
become foundational—the starting point of which is a state prerogative to control the entry 
and residence of aliens. Dembour labels this approach the “Strasbourg reversal” to signify 
the way that it reverses the prioritization the “pro homine” human rights approach, which 
places the individual above state sovereignty.38 
When Humans Become Migrants does not offer any explanation for these differences 
between the European and Inter-American human rights systems. Nor does it explore em-
pirically how decisions in the discussed cases were subsequently taken up by similarly 
                                                          
 35. Id. at 7. 
 36. Id. at 303. 
 37. Id. at 162. 
 38. DEMBOUR, supra note 30, at 5. 
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situated migrants, or by government officials, or by advocates for migrant rights. These 
are outside the scope of the study. However, Dembour also shies away from any empirical 
exploration of how the ideas of migrant advocacy groups have changed over time as new 
arguments are discovered and brought to the Court (strangely, she does not seem to have 
interviewed any of the expert litigators whose well-known test cases she describes). For 
the sake of preempting claims that advocates in Europe are to blame for failing to bring 
sympathetic cases, she stresses that, to the contrary, their persistent efforts to defend mi-
grants continue to be shut down by the majority of the European Court. Yet, as recent 
sociolegal scholarship has shown, one of the remarkable developments of the past twenty 
years has been the increased willingness of European immigrant rights legal activists to 
pursue cases before the European Court.39 Advocates are now much more comfortable 
using European case law, and their creativity in seeking out new legal avenues and grounds 
for decision makes this area of law much more dynamic than Dembour at times suggests. 
Dembour takes the view that audaciousness is preferable to timidity in international 
courts. While some might point out that the Inter-American Court’s aspirational use of 
rights rhetoric often remains unimplemented in the practices of states, she argues that the 
European Court’s case law likewise often remains incompletely implemented. Indeed, she 
points out that the United Kingdom continues to contest the European Court’s migration 
jurisprudence, even when it is relatively weak on migrant rights. The book is an elaborate 
argument to the European Court to give up on attempting to appease the British Govern-
ment’s conservatism on migration questions and to adopt a more extensive and rights-
protective jurisprudence in this area. 
CONCLUSION 
For advocates and scholars seeking to better understand the U.S. asylum system, the 
political science studies discussed in this review provide clear evidence that institutional 
design matters for asylum outcomes. As Miller et al. demonstrate through their extensive 
statistical analyses, U.S. asylum adjudication is characterized by striking variation across 
metropolitan districts and between individual immigration judges. Moreover, as Hamlin’s 
comparative study makes clear, the wide variation in how U.S. adjudicators handle asylum 
cases is much less present in an administrative system such as Canada’s, where there is a 
culture of investing resources in public administration and where experts enjoy greater 
insulation from interest group influence. 
Over the past three decades, the perceived shortcomings of the U.S. asylum system 
repeatedly have become a target for organized class action litigation.40 Court-ordered in-
junctions and settlement agreements have improved access to counsel and other procedural 
protections available in U.S. immigration courts. Yet litigation has been relatively less 
successful in countering the increased use of expedited asylum screening, which has char-
acterized border control policies in the U.S. and elsewhere.41 And the crude “streamlining” 
                                                          
 39. LEILA KAWAR, CONTESTING IMMIGRATION POLICY IN COURT: LEGAL ACTIVISM AND ITS RADIATING 
EFFECTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND FRANCE 146-50 (2015). 
 40. For a discussion of the policy impact of immigrant rights class action litigation, see id. at 103-26. 
 41. CAROL BOHMER & AMY SHUMAN, REJECTING REFUGEES: POLITICAL ASYLUM IN THE 21ST CENTURY 
(2008). 
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program implemented by Attorney General Ashcroft ten years ago, recounted by both Mil-
ler et al. and Hamlin, shows that a change in political will is required for a new culture of 
administrative justice to take hold. 
For advocates aiming to influence this broader shaping of public debates over inter-
national migration, Marie Dembour’s provocative yet gestural study offers food for 
thought, insofar as it places these issues in a broader historical framework. Examining the 
European Court’s initial forays into immigration matters, Dembour calls our attention to 
contemporary immigration law’s roots in racialized economic imperialism and shows how 
the juridical move of recasting former colonial subjects as “foreign migrants” continues to 
provide justification for courts to subordinate individual human rights to sovereign border 
control authority. Admittedly, turning to the Inter-American Court as an alternative model 
is not a fully satisfying solution, as it brushes over the dynamics of the Inter-American 
Court’s own politico-legal setting that limit the extent to which its doctrines might be suc-
cessfully transplanted elsewhere. Yet in carefully documenting the erasure of history and 
context in contemporary immigration jurisprudence, Dembour’s study serves as a re-
minder that reform initiatives must aim not only for institutional redesign but also for a 
rethinking of the current doctrinal subordination of migrant rights to sovereign border con-
trol authority. 
As all of these studies make clear, the adjudication of claims for asylum is insepara-
ble from the contemporary politics of migration and border control. This point is inescap-
able whether analysis is focused on the individual predispositions that influence how evi-
dence is interpreted in asylum cases, the institutionalized regimes that structure national 
asylum systems, or the foundational narratives that shape judicial imaginations of migrant 
rights. Exploring asylum adjudication from an externalist perspective offers a valuable 
reminder to legal specialists that they cannot take refuge in conceptually neat formalist 
analysis, but must instead remain sensitive to the complex and continuously evolving po-
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